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The  ELIE  scheme  of  Kolm  taxes  labour  capacities  instead  of  labour  income  in  order  to 
circumvent the distortionary eﬀect of taxation on labour supply. Still, Kolm does not study the 
impact  of  ELIE  on  human  capital  formation  and  investment.  In  this  paper,  we  build  an 
overlapping generations (OLG) model with heterogenous agents and endogenous growth driven 
by investment in human capital. We study the eﬀect of ELIE on education investment and other 
aggregate  economic  variables.  Calibrating  the  model  to  French  data,  we  highlight  a  trade-oﬀ 
between growth and redistribution. With a perfect credit market, ELIE is successful in reducing 
inequalities and poverty, but it is at the expense of lower investment in education and slower 
growth.  In  an  economy  with  an  imperfect  credit  market  where  individuals  cannot  borrow  to 
educate,  the  tradeoﬀ  between  growth  and  redistribution  is  not  overturned  but  is  less  severe. 
However,  it  is  possible  to  overturn  completely  that  trade-oﬀ  simply  by  changing  the  base  of 
taxation for the young generation which is equivalent to subsidising education. 
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Equal Labour Income Equalisation or ELIE is a form of taxation and transfer imagined
by Kolm (2005) in his theory of macrojustice. In this scheme, labour is the only source
of income. ELIE proposes to tax labour capacities, and not labour supply in order to
circumvent the distortionary eﬀect of taxation on labour supply.1
Kolm does not consider capital income by arguing that physical capital is itself produced
by labour, so that for macrojustice (not for microjustice) capital can be neglected. Lu-
brano (2009) builds a simple neo-classical growth model ` a la Solow (1956) and analyses
how the ELIE scheme reduces disposable savings and slows down physical capital accu-
mulation. Moreover, although capacities are at the centre of the ELIE scheme, nothing
is said by Kolm about the eﬀect of ELIE on decisions concerning investment in human
capital. When individuals can modify their capacities and their gross wages by invest-
ing in human capital, taxing capacities is likely to have an eﬀect on their incentives to
educate.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate what are the eﬀects of ELIE on human capital
accumulation. We introduce the ELIE scheme in an overlapping generations (OLG)
model where heterogenous agents choose how much to invest in education when young.
The initial model comes from Azariadis and de la Croix (2006), itself based on an
extension of Azariadis and Drazen (1990) to a world with heterogeneous agents. This
model has two important characteristics. First, both growth and the income distribution
are endogenous. We can therefore study how these two variables co-move facing changes
in the environment. Second, individuals diﬀer by their abilities, but not by their inherited
wealth. Taxing labour income will aﬀect incentives to educate and will redistribute
resources from the rich to the poor, and not the opposite as it is the case when agents
diﬀer in their initial endowments of physical capital, as in Garc´ ıa Pe˜ nalosa and Turnovsky
(2007).
In this model, we study how the ELIE scheme can inﬂuence individual decisions to invest
in education, the accumulation of human capital and income growth. We will focus on
long-run income growth and inequality without paying attention to possible losers and
gainers along the transition path. For that purpose, we will characterise the balanced
growth path of our overlapping generations model and analyse the eﬀect of introducing
an ELIE scheme on growth and inequality.
We will ﬁrst consider the eﬀect of ELIE on inequality, education and growth in a world
where the credit market is perfect, i.e. where all individuals can freely borrow for their
educational investment. We shall then consider a situation where human capital cannot
be collateralised and where individuals cannot borrow. In this case, we expect ELIE to
be less harmful for growth by redistributing resources towards those who are constrained
in their education decision. Indeed, as stressed by B´ enabou (2005), the tradeoﬀ between
growth and redistribution generated by a taxation scheme can depend on the availability
of a credit market. A scenario of “growth-enhancing redistribution” may seems relevant
1See Cardia, Kozhaya, and Ruge-Murcia (2003) for an estimation of this distortion based on a general
equilibrium model.
1when the capital market is less well-functioning or even unavailable. This scenario might
also be relevant if the young and old generations are taxed diﬀerently in order to subsidise
education.
The paper is organised as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. The extension
to the case of an imperfect credit market is proposed in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted
to the calibration and simulation of the long-run equilibrium. The tradeoﬀ between
growth and redistribution is analysed in Section 5. The tradeoﬀ between growth and
redistribution is overturned by a diﬀerent implementation in Section 6. The last section
concludes.
2 An overlapping generations model
The model is set up in discrete time, with time going from 0 to ∞. A unit of time
measures the length of a generation. At each point in time, two generations of workers
are alive. Junior workers (aged 18-39 to ﬁx ideas), and senior workers (aged 40-62).
Assuming that individuals are born a age 18 and die at age 62, we abstract from child-
hood and old-age. The complete model should include four generations. But as our
main concern is the trade-oﬀ between growth and intra-generational redistribution, we
neglect for simplicity the childhood and old-age generations. The number of individuals
born at time t is Nt. At one date t, total population includes Nt young workers and
Nt−1 old workers. Young workers chose either to work directly or to devote one part of
their time to specialise with an advanced program of education. Each young individual
i born at t is endowed with one unit of time. λit is the proportion of this time devoted to
further education while 1−λit the proportion of time devoted to work and earn money.
The tradeoﬀ they face is therefore between studying to improve their human capital for
getting more money when old and working for getting more money right now. Workers
beneﬁt from their further education during their second period of life, when reaching
seniority (i.e. age 40). This modeling choice reﬂects the idea that the skill premium
becomes much more important after 40. There is a retirement age which is determined
by a parameter ν that can be supposed to be the same for everybody and to be constant
over time. For instance if the length of a generation is 22 years and people retire at 59,
1 − ν = (62 − 60)/22 → ν = 10/11. The use of this parameter is simply to allow for
early retirement, knowing that in France the oﬃcial age of retirement is 60, while the
mean retirement age is most of the time around 59 and that workers retire at 65 in some
professions.
Heterogeneity is introduced by supposing that each agent i born at time t has a diﬀerent
ability. His ability vector denoted ǫit = (ǫY
it,ǫO
it) is drawn from a distribution deﬁned
over R2
+ (a bivariate lognormal for instance) with mean (1,1)′ and a variance-covariance
matrix Σ. ǫY
it is related to physical strength and is attached to the working ability when
young. For the same individual, ǫO
it incorporates elements related to his intellectual
capacities (IQ) and thus to his ability to learn and to make education proﬁtable when
he will be old in t + 1. We have two generations living at the same time. The old
2generation, born at t − 1 is characterised by a vector ǫt−1 drawn at t − 1 while the
younger generation is characterised by a second bivariate vector ǫt, drawn at t.
2.1 Human capital and growth
At each date t the old generation has an average human capital stock ¯ ht. Along a bal-
anced growth path, it is growing over time at rate g. Average human capital determines
a cultural environment from which everyone draws beneﬁts. The stock of human capital
of a member of the young generation (say at age 18) results from the combination of his







There are stronger and weaker individuals and that makes diﬀerences in the wage they
can earn. The wage rate per eﬃcient unit of human capital is denoted w and it is time
independent along the balanced growth path. The diﬀerence in earnings across young
individuals results from diﬀerences in abilities ǫY
it and diﬀerences in the number of hours
worked 1−λit. However, because the mean of ǫY
it was supposed to be unity, the average
wage rate in the young generation is equal to w. A young individual has to decide which




and which proportion λit of his time he will devote for advanced studies in order to







it, ψ(λit) tells how much education can be transformed into true future




When old, the individual will earn money by working the ﬁrst fraction ν of his second
period of life. He will rely on his savings for the last 1−ν part of his life.2 The function




′(λ) = +∞, lim
λ→1
ψ
′(λ) = 0, (5)
implying that it is always optimal to spend a strictly positive time span for building
human capital.
2The parameter ν is here only to analyse the sensitivity of the model to the retirement age. The
actual period of retirement beyond 62 is not included in the model.
3¯ ht is the average human capital of the old generation at time t (hence of individuals









Along a balanced growth path, the growth factor, denoted by G, is constant. Using (3),












In this model human capital is the sole engine of growth. Growth depends on two
terms. The ﬁrst term involves the heterogenous abilities of old workers ǫO
it. Thus growth
depends in a way on the results of a genetic lottery. The second term is the decision to
invest in human capital when young λit. This second factor results from the proﬁtability
of education. It can be inﬂuenced by economic policies, taxation and redistribution.
2.2 Income and education decisions
Individuals have to take decisions concerning investment in education (λit), consumption
cY
it and saving sit. Young individuals at present time t consume cY
it and save sit. At future
time t+1, they will consume cO
it+1 and will not save any longer; they are not altruistic and
it is therefore optimal for them to consume all their wealth when old. Their preferences
are represented by a utility function which depends on present and future consumption
only. It has the form of:
lnc
Y
it + β lnc
O
it+1. (8)
The old generation does not take into account the fact that the young generation beneﬁts
from its human capital. The intergenerational transmission channel operates with (1)
and is totaly involuntary. The utility function is simple and short-sighted.





it + sit. (9)
When getting old, the young generation will consume cO
it+1 that will be ﬁnanced partially
by future labour income (in a proportion equal to ν < 1 because of early retirement age),





it+1 + Rsit (10)
where w is the wage per unit of human capital and R is the return on capital between
the two periods; both are constant along a balanced growth path. We now determine
the life cycle total income Ωit for the young generation:








Since preferences do not depend on leisure, and as long as the capital market is perfect,
the individual decision problem is separable. We ﬁrst maximise life-cycle income to
4determine optimal education. Second, we maximise utility given income to determine
optimal saving and optimal consumption.








This implicit equation gives the optimal value of λit and thus represents the tradeoﬀ
between studying and working. The opportunity cost of an additional year of education
is ǫY
itw while its discounted beneﬁt is νǫO
itψ′(λit)w/R. Up to now, in the absence of any
redistribution mechanism, the decision of educating depends solely on the ratio between
physical and intellectual abilities and on the retirement age.
2.3 Firms
Firms produce the ﬁnal good with the following CES production function:3
Yt = A(αK
−θ




where Kt is the stock of physical capital, Lt is the labour input in eﬃciency units, A is a
parameter measuring total factor productivity, α ∈ (0,1) is related to the capital share4
and 1/(1 + θ) is the elasticity of substitution between the two factors. It is convenient
for the rest of the paper to note the production function in its intensive form, which
means explaining y = Y/L as a function of κ = K/L:
y = f(κ) = A(ακ
−θ + 1 − α)
−1/θ. (14)





κθ(1 − α) + α
. (15)
For 1/(1 + θ) = 1, i.e. θ = 0, we have the Cobb-Douglas case with its constant labour
share. For 1/(1 + θ) < 1, i.e. θ > 0, the wage share depends positively on the evolution
of the wage rate compared to the total factor productivity. For 1/(1+θ) > 1 and θ < 0,
this is just the reverse. A non-constant labour share might be justiﬁed for developed
countries as made apparent in Duﬀy and Papageorgiou (2000) with an elasticity of
substitution slightly greater than 1.
3For more details on the algebra of the CES production function, see e.g. de la Croix and Michel
(2002).
4Arrow et al. (1961) call α the distribution parameter.
5We assume that capital depreciate fully after one period. The competitive behaviour
of ﬁrms leads to the equalisation of marginal productivity to prices so that the rate of
return of capital and the wage rate are given by:
R = A−θα(y/κ)(θ+1)
w = A−θ(1 − α)(y)(θ+1).

















In this model, labour supply in eﬃciency units is for one part a function of personal
abilities, and is thus partly exogenous, but for the other part it results from an endoge-
nous decision depending on the proﬁtability of education. The taxation redistribution
ELIE scheme is going to modify labour supply because it will alter the proﬁtability of
education for the old generation. Let us investigate now how the ELIE scheme can be
introduced and how its potential distortional eﬀects can be reduced by a more careful
implementation.
2.4 Implementing ELIE in an OLG model
In order to have a self contained presentation, let us brieﬂy summarise the main char-
acteristics of the ELIE scheme. In a given society, the ELIE scheme is a self ﬁnanced
distributive system where taxes and subsidies, both denoted ti in Kolm (2005) and in
this volume, balance with
 
ti = 0 where i is an index covering all the individuals at a
given period of time. An equal amount of labour is taken from each individual i mea-
sured in terms of his productivity while an equal monetary amount, k ˜ w, is redistributed
to all, so that the net transfer is ti = −k(wi − ˜ w). The variable ˜ w is determined so as to
balance the system. k is a parameter which measures the taxation-redistribution rate.
As ELIE concerns only active age individuals, we are not going to apply this scheme
to the fraction of time 1 − ν during which people are pre-retired. In our OLG model,
the modeler directly observes the working capacities of the individuals as the vectors
ǫt and ǫt−1 are exogenous and given a priori. Thus the ELIE scheme can naturally be
implemented.
The introduction of an ELIE scheme is going however to modify the incentives faced
by individuals in this economy. First, taxation of individual i is based on his labour
capacities which are partially exogenous with the observed abilities ǫY
it and ǫO
it and par-
tially endogenous because there is a decision to be taken for λit, the degree of higher
education. Taxation will reduce the return on education. So the taxation basis should
6be chosen as carefully as possible in order to minimise this distortion. The second as-
pect of ELIE is that there is an equal redistribution to everybody. In the initial model,
young people might have to borrow in order to get supplementary education. Here, the
ELIE redistribution increases the incentives to educate by providing grants to young
individuals who have a weak endowment ǫY
it of physical strength.
For the young generation, we can either decide to tax their physical strength capacity
whatever their decision of getting educated during a fraction λit of the period. Or, we
can decide to tax only the fraction of their time devoted to work and leave aside from
the taxation base the fraction of their time during which they decide to educate. This
last option is a subsidy to education. In this section, we shall present the benchmark
model where the whole capacities of the young generation are taxed. This is in a way
a pure implementation of ELIE which taxes capacities independently of labour supply
decisions, here represented by λ. Reﬁnements and by the way more realistic cases are
considered in Section 6, where in particular we examine the consequences of using as a
taxation base only the fraction of the strength capacities that is devoted to actual work
and not to education. For the simple benchmark case, when the whole capacities are
taxed taxed, the young age budget constraint is




itw − ˜ y)] = c
Y
it + sit. (18)





itw − ˜ y)¯ ht. (19)
The old generation born at time t−1 also receive an identical transfer k˜ y¯ ht, which can be
written as k˜ yG¯ ht−1. This transfer must be multiplied by ν because only active workers
are concerned by ELIE transfers. Symmetrically, only the fraction ν of their capacities is
taxed. Once they have left the labour market, old workers only consume their previous
savings. There is no taxation nor redistribution. ELIE is kept independent of any type






it−1ψ(λit−1)w − G˜ y)] = c
O
it − Rsit−1. (20)





it−1ψ(λit−1)w − G˜ y)ν¯ ht−1. (21)
The taxes he has to pay are a direct function of his human capital and of the decision
to educate he took in the previous period. But what he receives depends on the the
level of both ˜ y and the growth rate g which are a function of past collective decisions to
educate.
We have to determine the constant ˜ y which will balance the budget of the system jointly
for the young born at time t and for the old born at time t − 1, because both live at














w − ˜ y
  
= 0 (22)
7because ¯ ht−1/¯ ht = 1/G. As the mean of ǫY















We retrieve the usual result of Kolm that ˜ y is equal to the mean wage ¯ w in the case of
a stationary economy (G = 1) and a degenerate ψ function with ψ(.) = 1.
2.5 Optimal education and savings with ELIE
To determine optimal education in the presence of the ELIE redistribution scheme, we









itw − ˜ y) + ν
(1 − k)ǫO




Proposition 1 (Optimal education with perfect credit market)










Proof. The ﬁrst order condition (24) corresponds to a maximum because the function
ψ(.) is concave.
The individual choice for λ depends on his capacities, on the taxation rate k and on
the endogenous rate of return on capital. Since ψ is a concave function, education is
increasing in the ratio of IQ to strength and in the age of retirement ν, and decreasing in
the tax rate k and in the rate of return on capital r. There is thus a clear distortionary
eﬀect of ELIE on the decision of educating. The previous case (12) can be recovered
of course with k = 0. But it can also be recovered if ν, the retirement age, is made a
function of k with for instance ν = ˜ ν/(1−k). Other solutions are also possible and will
be studied in Section 6.
Saving is determined by young people, taking into account the old people that they will
become. It is convenient to rewrite the income of the young for the ﬁrst period as
ω
Y




itw − ˜ y)]¯ ht (25)







itψ(λit)w − G˜ y)]¯ ht. (26)
Optimal saving sit is determined by a utility maximisation under two constraints:
max logcY




















As usual in OLG models where individuals work during two periods, savings depends
positively on income when young ωY
it and negatively on the discounted income when old
ωO
it+1 (de la Croix and Michel 2002).
2.6 Equilibrium
We shall now collect the diﬀerent parts of the solution in order to provide a formal
deﬁnition of the equilibrium. For that purpose, it is convenient to deﬁne the following
intensive variables, following the notations adopted for the CES production function:
ˆ ωY
i = ωY
it/¯ ht ˆ ωO
i = ωO
it/¯ ht ˆ si = sit/¯ ht
ˆ K = Kt/¯ ht ˆ L = Lt/¯ ht.
For deﬁning a stationary equilibrium, we suppose that the size of the young generation Nt
is kept proportional to NY while the size of the old generation Nt−1 is kept proportional
to NO so that their relative size is constant.
Deﬁnition 1 Given the policy parameter k, an equilibrium with a perfect credit market
is
• a vector of individual variables {λi, ˆ ωY
i , ˆ ωO
i ,ˆ si} satisfying for i = 1...NY :
ˆ ω
Y
i =(1 − λi)ǫ
Y
i w − k(ǫ
Y





i ψ(λi)w − νk(ǫ
O






























































κ = ˆ K/ˆ L. (36)







3 Imperfect credit market
We deﬁne an imperfect credit market as an environment in which young households
cannot credibly commit their future labour income as a collateral against current loans.
As in Kehoe and Levine (1993), we assume that individuals are allowed to borrow up
to the point where they are indiﬀerent between repaying loans and suﬀering market
exclusion. Since everyone dies at the end of the second period, default involves no
penalty and is individually optimal. As in this context it is optimal for them never to
pay back their credits, banks will always refuse to lend them money. The borrowing
constraint then takes the very simple form: sit ≥ 0.
Let us ﬁrst identify the individuals who are going to be aﬀected by this constraint.
Proposition 2 (Earnings proﬁle and borrowing constraint)
There exist a function Γ(ǫY ,ǫO), such that individual i is credit constrained if and only
if Γ(ǫY
it,ǫO





















with λit given by (24). The function Γ(.) is increasing in ǫY
it and decreasing in ǫO
it.
Proof. The function Γ(ǫY
it,ǫO
it) is derived from the condition sit ≥ 0 using the saving
function (27) and the deﬁnitions of incomes (25) and (26). Since λit is an increasing
10function of ǫY
it and a decreasing function of ǫY
it, the sign of the partial derivatives of Γ
are not ambiguous.
As in De Gregorio and Kim (2000) and in de la Croix and Michel (2007), households
with a steep potential earning proﬁle would like to borrow in order to study longer,
but credit rationing prevents them from doing so. All others have positive saving and
study as long as they wish. Hence constrained individuals are those with a relative low
strength and high IQ.
Note that the threshold function Γ depends on prices through (39). For example, when
yields r are high, there will be fewer constrained households, other things being equal.
Hence, although our borrowing constraint is very simple, the proportion of rationed
people depends on equilibrium prices.
For the constrained households, Equation (24) no longer determines their education
choice. Instead, these households maximise an autarkic utility, i.e. the utility they
could reach without being able to use the credit market to smooth consumption. More
explicitly, they choose education in order to maximise the utility function (8) where the




















itψ(λit)w + kG˜ y
 
+ (1 + β)ln¯ ht + β lnν.
Proposition 3 (Optimal education with imperfect credit market)
The autarkic utility of an individual i with Γ(ǫY
it,ǫO
it) < 0 is maximised for the unique
value of λit satisfying
 















Proof. The left hand side of (40) is decreasing in λit, going from +∞ to 0 as λit goes
from 0 to 1. The right hand side of (40) is increasing in λit. Hence there exists a unique
λit equalising these two terms.
We can now deﬁne the equilibrium with an imperfect credit market.
Deﬁnition 2 Given the policy parameter k, an equilibrium with an imperfect credit
market is
• a vector of individual variables {ˆ ωY
i , ˆ ωO




































i ) ≥ 0,




















i ) ≥ 0.
• a vector of aggregate variables {G, ˜ y, ˆ K, ˆ L,κ} satisfying (32)-(36).
• and a vector of prices {R,w} satisfying (37)-(38)
When the credit market is perfect, ELIE acts as a obstacle to the decision of educating.
When the credit market is imperfect, the ELIE scheme can help the constrained indi-
viduals in their decision to educating. The ability of ELIE to promote education will
then depend on the proportion of constrained individuals.
4 Numerical simulation of the equilibrium
The objective of this section is to calibrate and simulate the benchmark version of the
model. Doing so will allow us to assess the size of the tradeoﬀ between growth and
redistribution in the perfect market case and to determine whether it is modiﬁed by the
presence of borrowing constraints (imperfect credit market).
Assumed that one period of the model is 22 years. It is then useful to deﬁne the annual
growth rate of income and the annual interest rate as:
g = G
1/22 − 1, r = R
1/22 − 1
4.1 A priori information
We ﬁrst choose a functional form for the production function of human capital and the
distribution of abilities. The production of human capital has to satisfy the two limit









where γ ∈ (0,1) and b is a scale parameter used as a degree of freedom for calibrating
the model. In Figure 1, we have graphed this function for a range of values for γ that
are within the domain compatible with our calibration exercise. The scale parameter b
was adjusted accordingly to obtain a nice graph.
The psychological discount factor of individuals is set to 3% per year. As we have
assumed that one period of the model is 22 years, we have: β = 0.9722 = 0.512. The























Figure 1: Production function of human capital
which yields 1 + n = 1.177.5 Finally, we have taken NY = 10000, which implies that
NO = NY/1.177 = 8496.
The abilities bivariate index (ǫY ,ǫO) is assumed to be distributed over a generation
according to a bivariate lognormal distribution. The usual way of obtaining a lognormal
distributed random variable is to take the exponential of a normal random variable. Let


































This matrix has three parameters: the correlation ρ and the two variances σ2
Y and
σ2
O. The resulting lognormal distribution has marginal means equal to exp( i + σ2
i ),
marginal variances equal to ς2
i = (exp(σ2
i)−1)exp(2 i+σ2
i). The correlation coeﬃcient








When ρ = 0, ̺ = 0, but when ρ  = 0, then |̺| < |ρ|. Even if ρ is kept ﬁxed, ̺ varies
with σi. It is convenient, for elicitation purposes, to reparametrise this matrix in σ2
Y, ρ
and the relative variances σ2
O/σ2
Y. We do not have much information to calibrate this
variance-covariance matrix. The parameter σ2
Y can be adjusted to match a measure of
5The total population in France is available from the Web site of INSEE
http://www.insee.fr/fr/ﬀc/pop age2.htm, Population totale par sexe et ˆ age au 1er janvier 2007,
France m´ etropolitaine. From these annual data, we computed the ratio between the population born
between 1960 and 1981 and the population born between 1938 and 1959. The value of this ratio is
1.177.
13inequality for the observed income distribution in France. The Gini coeﬃcient obtained
on French gross income data and equal to 0.327 in 1998.6 This will be matched with
the Gini coeﬃcient implied by the model (computed in Appendix A). But we have no
precise procedure to calibrate the two other parameters. It seems reasonable to assume
that the ability to work when young is equally dispersed as the ability to work when old.
However, ability in youth only reﬂects diﬀerent endowments in eﬃcient labour, while
ability in old age also embodies the ability to accumulate human capital. We select
σ2
O/σ2
Y = 1 in a ﬁrst step and will carry some sensitivity analysis for σ2
O/σ2
Y = 1.5. The
parameter ρ directly inﬂuences to proportion of types in society. With ρ = 0, the four
possible types detailed below are in equal proportion. We will take ρ = 0 as a benchmark
and we will carry sensitivity analysis for ρ = −0.9 which maximises the proportion of
the type for which education makes an important diﬀerence.
We assume that people retire at the age of 59 as reported by the OECD in 2002. This
imply that ν ≃ 10/11.
The productivity parameter b governs the long-term growth rate of output per capita.
We shall adjust it on the observed growth rate of GDP per capita that we collected
from Maddison (2007) data over the period 1981-2003. We have G = 1.44, which gives
an annual growth rate g of 1.67%. The parameter γ determines the time spent on
education in the ﬁrst period of life. We shall adjust it so as to match the observed
share of time devoted to education. We assume that the ﬁrst period of the model covers
ages 18-39. Doing so supposes that higher education is an alternative to working, but
elementary and secondary education is not. The percentage of time devoted to schooling
is computed using Education at a Glance from OECD (2006) (Indicator A3, page 53).
We use Tertiary type A and B graduation rates and obtain λ = 0.075.
As far as technology is concerned, we borrow from Duﬀy and Papageorgiou (2000) the
conclusion that, in developed countries, the elasticity of substitution between capital and
labour adjusted human capital is of the order of 1.1 and we set θ = −0.1. From Askenasy
(2003) we take that the share of capital in value added, κ/y, is 0.35 (it ﬂuctuates between
0.32 and 0.38 in the last 30 years). The physical capital share parameter α will we set to
match this value. We also learn from this study that the rate of return on capital in the
manufacturing sector ﬂuctuates between 9% and 14%. We do not use this information
directly but it will serve as a benchmark to check whether our equilibrium r is in line
with the data. Finally, the scale parameter A is normalised to 1. Varying A leaves
everything else unchanged provided that we adjust α to keep the same capital share.
We now summarise the available a prior information in Table 1.
6This ﬁgure comes from the Human Development Report of the United Nations
http://hdrstats.undp.org/indicators/147.html. It can also be found elsewhere, such as in the
World Fact Book of the CIA.
14Table 1: A priori information used for calibration
σ2
O/σ2
Y ρ NY /NO ν κ/y β θ g λ Gini
1.0 0.0 1.177 0.91 0.35 0.512 -0.1 1.67% 0.075 0.327
1.5 0.0 1.177 0.91 0.35 0.512 -0.1 1.67% 0.075 0.327
1.0 -0.9 1.177 0.91 0.35 0.512 -0.1 1.67% 0.075 0.327
The ﬁrst line is used for calibrating the benchmark model. The last two lines are used for
sensitivity analysis.
4.2 Calibration of the model
In order to impose the a priori information on growth, education and inequality, we have
four parameters of adjustment, the two parameters of the production function of human
capital ψ(λ), a scale parameter for the variance covariance matrix of the lognormal
distribution σ2
Y, and the capital share parameter α. Given starting values for the rate of
return on capital r and the wage rate w, the model is solved iteratively using the ﬁxed
point algorithm described in Appendix B, conditionally on initial given values for γ, b,
σ2
Y and α. As a by-product, the model produces a vector λ, a growth rate g, an income
distribution for which a Gini coeﬃcient is computed, and a capital share in value added
κ/y. The four adjustment parameters are then updated using the following scheme
γ = γ + (0.075 − ¯ λ)




α = α + (0.35 − κ/y)
and the process is iterated until convergence is reached. We found the following solution
displayed in Table 2. The obtained rate of return on capital is 10.14% on an annual
basis which is within the range provided by Askenasy (2003).
Table 2: Calibration and solutions of the initial model
α γ b σ2
Y r g λ Gini κ/y
Perfect credit mkt 0.475 0.456 2.387 0.204 10.14% 1.67% 0.075 0.327 0.350
Imperf. credit mkt (0) 0.475 0.456 2.387 0.204 9.94% 1.59% 0.070 0.316 0.352
Imperf. credit mkt (1) 0.475 0.456 2.421 0.223 10.02% 1.67% 0.070 0.327 0.351
Imperf. credit mkt (2) 0.475 0.456 2.431 0.204 10.04% 1.67% 0.070 0.316 0.351
Imperf. credit mkt (3) 0.473 0.503 3.027 0.211 10.02% 1.67% 0.075 0.327 0.350
In (0), no parameter is adjusted. In (1), b and σ2
Y are adjusted, in (2), only b is adjusted, in (3) the
four parameters are adjusted.
Let us now calibrate the model with an imperfect credit market. When we keep the same
parameters, we see from the second line of Table 2 that credit rationing entails a drop
in education and growth, and incidently in inequality too. The capital share increases.
In order to make comparisons between the two cases, we have to recalibrate some of the
15parameters. We recalibrate b in order to match the same growth rate as before, which
requires an increase in this coeﬃcient to compensate for the loss of growth due to the
imperfection of the credit market. We also recalibrate σ2
Y to match the required level of
inequality. Matching the same growth-inequality pair in the two versions of the model
allows to compare the trade-oﬀ between growth and redistribution across them. We do
not alter the parameters γ and α to make the two models similar in this respect.
The results are reported in the line labeled (1) of Table 2. We also report a calibration
where we only adjust parameter b and leads to a similar result. In the last line of Table 2,
the one labeled (3), we report a calibration of the imperfect credit market model where
we compute the four parameters γ, b, σ2
Y and α in order to match the four targets g,
λ, Gini and the capital share. We see that doing so requires an important rise in the
elasticity of human capital to education γ.
4.3 Heterogenous behaviour without redistribution
To better grasp the logic of the model, we distinguish four groups of individuals, de-
pending on their abilities ǫY when young and ǫO when old. Given the median of each
marginal of the joint distribution of (ǫY ,ǫO), we classify each individual in a two by two
entry table. Type 00 has a physical strength ǫY lower than the median and an intellect
ǫO lower than the median. For convenience, we call this type white collars. Type 10 has a
physical strength ǫY greater than the median and an intellect ǫO lower than the median.
We call this type blue collars. Type 01 a physical strength lower than the median and
an intellect greater than the median. We call this type academics. Finally, type 11 has
a higher physical strength and a higher intellect. We call this type managers. Table 3
presents some characteristics of these diﬀerent groups. As ρ = 0, each type represents
25% of our sample.
Table 3: Education and saving decisions
Education Net savings Borrow. prop. Income young Life cycle income
ǫY ǫO 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Perfect credit market
(0.075) (0.017) (0.116) (0.073) (0.086)
0 0.062 0.154 0.011 0.001 0.026 0.410 0.048 0.043 0.056 0.067
1 0.021 0.063 0.032 0.023 0.000 0.027 0.102 0.098 0.107 0.115
Imperfect credit market
(0.070) (0.018) (0.000) (0.074) (0.087)
0 0.064 0.129 0.011 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.044 0.055 0.065
1 0.021 0.066 0.032 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.105 0.100 0.110 0.117
Physical strength when young is indicated in column and intelligence when old is indicated in
line. The mean value for each small two-two table is indicated between brackets. The total life
cycle income for a young individual is given by ˜ ωit = ωY
it + [(1 − k)ǫO
itψ(λit)w + kG˜ y]ν/R.
All types decide to educate, but according to diﬀerent degrees. Types 00 and 11 choose
to educate around the mean, type 01 (academics) chooses to educate twice the mean,
16while type 10 (blue collars) has the lowest decision of education. These decisions have
marked consequences. Type 10 (blue collars) are major savers because they will earn well
above the mean when young, but below the mean when old. Type 01 (academics) net
saving is roughly zero. 41% of this group borrow to ﬁnance longer education and have
the prospect of earning a very high wage when old. Notice that the group of academics
will earn the minimum when young (roughly the same as white collars), but will receive
the maximum when old so that over the life cycle their earn more than white collars.
Managers and blue collars receive a similar average income when young, but a quite
diﬀerent one when old.
Considering now the equilibrium with an imperfect credit market, we observe that the
academics 01 are strongly hit by the impossibility to borrow. Their education is reduced,
and their life-cycle income as well.
We have analysed the sensitivity of these results to the choice of ρ. Increasing correlation
up to ρ = 0.50 and recalibrating the model to ﬁt observed growth, education and
inequality, we observe that this higher correlation between abilities greatly diminishes
the proportion of borrowers. The type proportion is changed to 0.333 (white collars and
managers) and 0.167 (blue collars and academics). In this world, 33.1% of the academics
borrow money for educating which relates to an average of 7.8% in the whole economy
(instead of 11.6% in the benchmark calibration).
We do a similar exercise for σ2
O/σ2
Y = 1.5 while keeping ρ = 0 to investigate the robustness
of the results to diﬀerent relative variances. In this case the type proportions are only
very slightly modiﬁed compared to the benchmark. 36.6% of the academics borrow
money for educating which relates to an average of 10.4% in the whole economy. Results
are close to those of the benchmark.
5 The tradeoﬀ between growth and redistribution
We now introduce the ELIE transfer system. We do so by letting k vary between 0
and 0.40. Let us recall that k = 0.40 means that for a working week of ﬁve days,
the product of two days is taken for redistribution. Remember that in our model both
inequality and growth are endogenous. We have seen in Proposition 1 that individual
investment in education is negatively aﬀected by taxation k, but this was only a partial
equilibrium eﬀect, for a given rate of return on capital. We will now investigate whether
this partial equilibrium eﬀect carries over to the general equilibrium framework; the
numerical simulation will also allow us to quantify this eﬀect. In section 6, we investigate
how this trade-oﬀ can be overturned by a diﬀerent implementation of ELIE.
As the system balances, money is taken from some individuals and distributed to others.
If the focus of the analysis was on the life cycle of one generation in the previous section,
it has now to be on the two generations together. This means that at time t, we have to
study the interaction between young and old and detail the possible intergenerational
transfers. The ELIE transfer system has the particularity of reducing inequality in the
17income distribution. We will investigate by how much does the ELIE scheme aﬀect the
Gini coeﬃcient of young and old incomes.
5.1 Simulations results
Let us ﬁrst analyse the impact of ELIE on macroeconomic variables, before analysing
its impact in term of inequality and poverty. First consider the case of a perfect credit
market. The impact of ELIE on the growth rate is negative as shown in Table 4. The
young generation decides to educate less and growth in our model is aﬀected solely by
the growth of human capital. However, ELIE also decreases the proportion of young
individuals that are obliged to borrow to ﬁnance their supplementary education. The
lower investment in education allows an increasing capital labour ratio which in turn
implies an increase in the wage rate per eﬃcient unit of human capital and a lower rate
of return on capital. The decrease in the rate of return on capital dampens the negative
eﬀect of k on the decision of education but does not overturn it.
Considering now the imperfect credit market case, the question here is whether the
negative eﬀect of redistribution on growth via the distortion highlighted above can be
overturned by a positive eﬀect of redistribution on growth through the easing of bor-
rowing limits bearing on poor people. The answer is no. Table 4 shows that growth is
still decreasing in k, indicating that the predominant eﬀect is still the distortion one.
But the drop in growth is slightly less severe than in the previous case, indicating that
the eﬀect of ELIE on borrowing limits help to limit the cost of taxation in terms of
growth. If the proportion of constrained individuals on the credit market were larger,
the compensating eﬀect of ELIE would have been larger.
Table 4: Macroeconomic impact of ELIE
k g r λ Saving Percent. % credit Gini Headcount
(% annual) rate borrowers constr. poverty
Perfect credit market
0.0 1.67 10.14 0.075 22.88 11.63 0.00 0.327 0.281
0.1 1.52 9.95 0.069 22.86 9.28 0.00 0.295 0.242
0.2 1.35 9.73 0.063 22.85 7.04 0.00 0.264 0.195
0.3 1.15 9.48 0.056 22.83 4.99 0.00 0.232 0.143
0.4 0.91 9.19 0.050 22.82 3.39 0.00 0.200 0.082
Imperfect credit market
0.0 1.67 10.02 0.070 23.61 0.00 13.77 0.327 0.287
0.1 1.54 9.89 0.066 23.42 0.00 11.05 0.298 0.251
0.2 1.39 9.72 0.061 23.25 0.00 8.27 0.268 0.204
0.3 1.21 9.51 0.055 23.11 0.00 5.85 0.237 0.153
0.4 0.99 9.25 0.049 23.00 0.00 3.87 0.205 0.090
18The right panel of Table 4 provides inequality measures for diﬀerent k in the two
economies. Not surprisingly, ELIE manages to reduce inequality in the population (this
is also true for within group inequality, but inequality remains greater in the older gen-
eration.) We deﬁne a poverty level as 60% of the mean income.7 We compute a head
count measure of poverty as the proportion of individuals below the poverty level. In-
creasing k from 0.00 to 0.40 allows to decrease poverty from 28.1% of the population to
8.2%. Comparing the model with perfect credit market to the one with imperfect credit
market, we observe that ELIE diminishes the Gini coeﬃcient in the same way in both
cases, but is slightly less eﬃcient at reducing poverty when credit market is imperfect.
Notice that, if one wishes to totally remove poverty, one needs to push k as high as 0.60.
The elimination of poverty by the ELIE scheme is further illustrated in Fig. 2. We
observe that the income distribution is fairly regular and corresponds to the shape of
a log-normal distribution when there is no redistribution. The ELIE scheme shifts the
whole distribution to the right (poverty reduction), except for the extreme right tail
which is dampened (inequality reduction). We only report the graph for the perfect


















Figure 2: Income distribution with perfect credit market
7There are various ways of deﬁning a relative poverty line. EUROSTAT deﬁnes the poverty level
as 60% of the median income. France and INSEE use 50% of the median income. The European
Commission once used 50% of the mean in its reports. See Atkinson (1998) for a discussion.
195.2 Assessing the size of the tradeoﬀ
We have seen in the previous section that increasing the value of k reduces growth but
promotes redistribution and reduces poverty. We measure inequality using a Gini index
computed on the total income distribution and poverty using the P0 index of Foster,
Greer, and Thorbecke (1984). The importance of the trade-oﬀ between growth and
redistribution is illustrated in Fig. 3 where the graph of 1−Gini and 1 − P0 against the
annual growth rate is displayed. We give this graph both when credit market is perfect
and when it is imperfect. The diﬀerence between these two cases is not negligible, but
not large either. We can measure the diﬀerence in the tradeoﬀ by comparing the slope
of the two curves. The slope with perfect credit market is equal to -5.90, which implies
that reducing the Gini by 1 point costs 0.059 in term of annual growth rate. In the
imperfect market case, the slope is lower in absolute value and equal to -5.58. The ratio
of two slopes is 0.95. Hence the tradeoﬀ between growth and redistribution is slightly
































1 − P0 rationing
Figure 3: Trade-oﬀ between redistribution and growth for k = 0 to k = 0.4
As far as poverty is concerned, reducing poverty by 1 point costs 0.0376 in terms of
annual growth rate. This cost drops to 0.0347 when the credit market is imperfect.
Here the ratio of the two slopes is 0.92. These numbers indicate that ELIE is quite
good at reducing poverty at a relatively low cost in terms of growth, and that this is
20even more true if individuals face borrowing constraints. Still again, we are far from a
case of “growth-enhancing redistribution”, where redistribution lifts so much the credit
constraints that the de-incitative eﬀect on growth is overturned, as suggested by B´ enabou
(2005) for instance.
5.3 The trade-oﬀ with a larger proportion of 01 type
When the credit market is imperfect, the ELIE scheme helps some poor individuals
to invest in education. These are the 01 types (the academics) who have a strong
potential in terms of future income growth but little resources when young. This is why
the tradeoﬀ between growth and redistribution is less severe when the credit market
is imperfect. But ELIE also redistributes to the 00 types (white-collars), which is ﬁne
as far as equality is concerned, but is of no help as far as growth is concerned. This
explains why the trade-oﬀ is not modiﬁed much when the credit market is imperfect.
Unless ELIE is targeted towards the 01 households, its eﬀect on borrowing constraints
is not strong enough to suppress its negative eﬀect on growth.
To illustrate this point, we consider a calibration of the model with a strong negative
correlation between the two ability shocks: ρ = −0.9. In that case the economy is
mostly composed of academics and blue collars (43% of population each). Among young
individuals, ELIE will redistribute in favour of academics, without “wasting” too much
resources on white collars, who form a small 7% fraction of the population. Hence,
ELIE is much more targeted towards persons with a strong growth potential. Assuming
such a strong negative correlation is of course unrealistic, but this simulation is meant
to illustrate the properties of the ELIE scheme as a function of the type of ability
distribution in the population.
We recalibrate the model with a perfect market using ρ = −0.9. This gives γ = 0.413,
b = 1.890, σ2
Y = 0.159 and α = 0.475. The empirical correlation between the two shocks
is ̺ = −0.74. We also recalibrate the model with an imperfect credit market to obtain
the same growth and inequality without ELIE (b = 1.931 and σ2
Y = 0.188). Then we
simulate various levels of redistribution by letting k vary between 0.00 and 0.40.
The distance between the curves with perfect and imperfect credit market is now more
important. This is because ELIE is now more targeted towards 01 people and plays
therefore a greater role in alleviating the credit constraints for the individuals with a
strong growth proﬁle. The ratio between the two slopes is now 0.87 (against 0.95) for
the 1−Gini slopes and 0.81 (against 0.92) for the 1 − P0 slopes.
Notice ﬁnally that the case with ρ = −0.9 is the most favourable situation to generate
a positive inﬂuence of ELIE on growth. Although we know little on the distribution of
abilities in the population, and hence the parameters of this distribution are subject to
a large uncertainty, it seems pretty clear now that no parameter conﬁguration would
be able to reverse the tradeoﬀ between growth and redistribution. We have to ﬁnd
something else.
216 How to overturn the trade-oﬀ
The original ELIE has no distortionary impact because the tax base is chosen indepen-
dently of labour supply decisions. Once we introduce a decision for educating in a two
generation model, the distortionary eﬀect reappears. We have studied up to now the
least favourable case. We have given indications on how to reduce the distortionary eﬀect
of ELIE by an alternative implementation. We now explore two possibilities which are
equivalent to either subsidising education in the ﬁrst period or making it more proﬁtable
in the second period.
6.1 Education subsidies
The crucial decision of educating has to be taken in the ﬁrst period. ELIE had a dis-
incitative eﬀect on that decision, because income when senior is taxed at a proportional
rate while the opportunity cost when young is not tax deductible (the whole physical
capacity ǫY
it was taken as a basis for taxation). In doing so, we had a dogmatic vision of
ELIE where the taxation basic must be independent of labour supply decisions and thus
of λ. What happens if we now decide to apply ELIE only to the sole fraction of ǫY
it that
is devoted to actual work and to exclude the fraction which is devoted to education?
The taxation base is no longer ǫY
it, but (1 − λit)ǫY
it. The young age budget constraint is
¯ ht[(1 − λit)ǫ
Y
itw − k((1 − λit)ǫ
Y
itw − ˜ y)] = c
Y
it + sit. (43)
instead of Equation (18). The net transfer to a young individual i is now:
t
Y
it = −k((1 − λit)ǫ
Y
itw − ˜ y)¯ ht, (44)
replacing Equation (19) of the benchmark. As in the benchmark, they receive k˜ y¯ ht
(while equilibrium ˜ y will be diﬀerent). But in the benchmark case, they had to pay
kǫY
itw¯ ht, while here, they have only to contribute to the system for k(1−λit)ǫY
itw¯ ht. The
more they educate, the less they contribute to the system in the ﬁrst period. There
is thus a subsidy to educating and implicitly a transfer from the old generation to the
young generation.
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22We can no longer simplify the expression using the assumption that the mean of the ǫY
it
is one. To determine optimal education in this new scheme, we maximise income over
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which is the same expression as in the case when there is no ELIE scheme (Equa-
tion (12)). Hence, when education time is deductible from taxes, the distortionary eﬀect
of ELIE should disappear. The implicit subsidy implied by the deductibility exactly
oﬀset the eﬀect of the tax bearing on future income. Compared to the benchmark, we
will no longer have the distortion on education choices; but we will have a lower transfer
˜ y since the tax basis has been shrunk.
6.2 Linking early retirement to redistribution
As an alternative to subsidising education in the ﬁrst period, we can make it more
proﬁtable in the second period, simply by increasing the early retirement age ν. Equa-





where ˜ ν is the retirement age in the case without ELIE scheme. Then, the optimal rule
for education (24) becomes Equation (47) again. Increasing the length of active live
raises the return on education investment. Here, by letting the retirement age increase
with redistribution, we compensate the negative eﬀect of the ELIE tax on education
by increasing length of active life and, hence, the return on education. Again here,
the distortionary eﬀect of ELIE disappears. We are left with a rising labour supply as
redistribution increases.
6.3 Numerical assessment
The two alternative eﬃcient implementations of ELIE have clearly diﬀerent macroeco-
nomic properties, despite the fact that they both imply the same decision function for
educating. They are not equally feasible. If subsidising education is possible whatever
the value of k, postponing retirement as a function of k can be implemented only for a
small range of values of k. Here as ν is already close to 1, this solution can work only
for k ≤ 0.1.
Table 5 illustrate the macroeconomic properties of these two implementations using the
same calibration as before with a perfect credit market. We give between brackets re-
sults for the option consisting in postponing retirement. When education is subsidised,
23the rate of growth of the economy is no longer decreasing with k, but is even slightly
increasing with it (more increasing). The rate of return of capital remains more or less
constant (increases) as well as the capital share (decreases). The wage rate increases (de-
creases). Education slightly increases (strongly increases). The percentage of borrowers
decreases and is lower than in the benchmark model (decreases slowly and less than
in the benchmark model). The share of the young generation in total income slightly
increases (decreases). If we now look at inequality and poverty, they are both slightly
Table 5: Macroeconomic impact of ELIE with subsidies to education
k g r λ Saving Percent. Gini Headcount
(% annual) rate borrowers total poverty
Subsidising education
0.0 1.67 10.14 0.075 22.88 11.63 0.327 0.281
0.1 1.68 10.13 0.075 22.91 9.20 0.294 0.241
0.2 1.68 10.12 0.075 22.94 6.64 0.262 0.193
0.3 1.68 10.11 0.076 22.98 4.41 0.229 0.140
0.4 1.69 10.11 0.076 23.01 2.76 0.196 0.078
Decreasing pre-retirement
0.0 1.67 10.14 0.075 22.88 11.63 0.327 0.281
0.1 1.73 10.53 0.078 22.39 10.18 0.294 0.242
more reduced compared to the benchmark model. But postponing retirement decreases
inequality less in the young generation but more in the old generation, compared to the
solution of subsidising education.
It is thus fairly possible to ﬁnd an implementation of ELIE that has no distortive ef-
fect. On the contrary, that new implementation can even be growth enhancing, even
if the credit market is perfect. The solution of subsidising education is much easier
to implement and certainly more politically feasible than postponing retirement. In
the benchmark model, the equilibrium wage rate and the pivot for redistribution ˜ y are
roughly equal. When education is subsidised, w is 3.5% higher than ˜ y. So there is
slightly less to redistribute, but in both cases w and ˜ y increase with k at exactly the
same pace. Moreover, inequality in the young generation is unaﬀected by subsidising
education. Inequality in the old generation is signiﬁcantly reduced when education is
subsidised in the ﬁrst period so that overall inequality and poverty are more reduced in
that case than in the benchmark model.
7 Conclusion
The ELIE scheme of Kolm (2005) proposes to tax labour capacities instead of labour
income in order to circumvent the distortionary eﬀect of taxation on labour supply. The
question of human capital formation and investment was not addressed by Kolm (2005),
who conﬁnes his analysis to a static world.
24In this paper, we have built an overlapping generations model with heterogenous agents
and endogenous growth driven by investment in human capital. We have studied the
eﬀect of the ELIE scheme on education investment decisions and other aggregate eco-
nomic variables. The fundamental question is to decide how to implement the ELIE
scheme in this growth model and which part of the capacities to use as a basis for tax-
ation. Clearly, the whole capacities can be taxed for the old generation. For the young
generation, theory shows that, ceteris paribus, ELIE has a negative eﬀect on investment
decisions in education if the whole capacities are taxed. This eﬀect arises because ELIE
taxes future labour income, which reduces the return to investment in human capital.
The distortionary eﬀect of ELIE is completely overturned if the part of the capacities
that are used for ﬁnancing education are taken out of the tax base. This is a form of
subsidy to education.
Calibrating the model on French data, we illustrate the traditional trade-oﬀ between
growth and inequality when the whole capacities are taxed. In its crude implementation,
ELIE is successful at reducing inequality and poverty, but at the expense of a lower
investment in education and a slower growth rate. In a world with an imperfect market
where individuals cannot borrow to educate in the ﬁrst period, the tradeoﬀ between
growth and redistribution is modiﬁed. Indeed, in such a world, ELIE helps poor students
to ﬁnance their education which counteracts partly its negative eﬀect on the return to
education. But since ELIE redistributes to all poor people, and not only to those with
a strong growth potential, the beneﬁcial eﬀect of ELIE obtained by lifting borrowing
constraints is quantitatively small.
Using an alternative implementation of ELIE, growth can remain constant while in-
equality is reduced. This variant of the model, calibrated on French data, shows that
education has to be subsidised if we want to escape from the traditional trade-oﬀ between
growth and redistribution. Moreover, the usual argument according to which students
should pay high fees at the university because those fees are partly compensated by their
discounted future earnings is wrong. Our model shows that when there is redistribution,
high fees have a disincitative eﬀect on education decisions. And it also shows that sub-
sidising education when there is redistribution enhance growth and reduces inequality
in a better way.
Appendix A. Model’s income distribution
We give here the formula to derive the net income distribution of the population living at
time t. It is formed by the concatenation of the vector of income of the young generation
and of the vector of income of the old generation living at the same time. For the young
generation the budget constraint gives:
ω
Y
i = (1 − λi)ε
Y
i w − k(ǫ
Y
i w − ˜ y) for i = 1...N
Y .
For the old generation, the net income is, still up to the multiplicative factor ¯ ht, estab-
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The income distribution is computed for the age group 18-62. Accordingly, the relevant
income of the old generation is here ωO
it, and ν does not enter this formula, contrary to
(20). We compute the Gini coeﬃcient for ω.
Appendix B. Numerical methods
The model is solved using a traditional ﬁxed point algorithm. We give below the pro-
cedure to compute the equilibrium with credit constraints for given parameters. The
case without constraints is just a simpliﬁcation of this more complicated case. We ﬁrst
have to ﬁx starting values for the aggregate variables r, w and ˜ y. Then we apply the
following algorithm.
- Step 1 identify constrained agents running (39) for the ﬁrst generation using ǫt,
store the results in id1. Do the same for the second generation using ǫt−1 and store
the result in id2.
- Step 2
– compute the optimal λ using (24)
– compute the constrained optimal λc solving (40) using a ﬁxed point algorithm
– λj = idjλ + (1 − idj)λc for j = 1,2.
- Step 3 compute the growth rate g, the diﬀerent income and transfers vectors, and
the vector of savings. Deduce K, L, r, w and ˜ y.
- Step 4 Check the change in λ1 and ˜ y. If the sum of the absolute changes is greater
than 10−6, go to step 1. Otherwise deliver the needed vectors and equilibrium
values.
In the unconstrained case, step 1 does not exist and step 2 does not involve computing
λc.
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